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COMMENTARY
THOUGHTS ON STATE ACTION: THE "GOVERNMENT
FUNCTION" AND "POWER THEORY"
APPROACHES
JESSE H. CHOPER*
The concept of "state action" continues to confound both courts and
commentators. A dozen years ago, Charles Black aptly characterized
modem judicial analysis of the state action problem as a "conceptual
disaster area."' Just last year Laurence Tribe, echoing the conclusion
two decades earlier of William Van Alstyne and Kenneth Karst, under-
standably found contemporary state action doctrine to be in a condi-
tion of "bankruptcy."' Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that "formulating an infallible test" for state action is an
"impossible task."3
Given the formidable difficulties involved, I certainly will not at-
tempt here to set forth any comprehensive solution to the problem.
Rather, I would like to make a series of observations (and develop a
few) that I hope will advance, rather than further confuse, analysis of
this extremely perplexing constitutional issue.
I.
The primary purpose of the state action requirement of the four-
teenth amendment's due process and equal protection provisions is not
to protect individual autonomy; that is, it is not meant to guarantee
individuals immunity from all governmental regulation. Rather, the
state action requirement serves to allocate power within the federal sys-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.S., 1957, Wilkes College; LL.B.,
1960, University of Pennsylvania; D. Hu. Litt., 1967, Wilkes College. I wish to express thanks to
my colleagues, Paul J. Mishkin, Jan Vetter, and William A. Fletcher, for their valuable criticisms,
and to Brian E. Gray of the class of 1979 for his assistance in the preparation of this commentary.
I. See Black, "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 69, 95 (1967).
2. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1978); see Van Alstyne & Karst, State
.4ction, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 58 (1961).
3. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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tem; it limits the power of the national government vis-a-vis the states.4
Thus, in cases presenting a true state action issue, the question is not
whether the individual whose conduct is being challenged has a consti-
tutional right to engage in that conduct; the power of the state to forbid
that conduct is ordinarily conceded. Rather, given the state's failure to
do so, the question is whether, nonetheless, the authority delegated to
the national government by the fourteenth amendment extends to
prohibiting the individual's conduct. Usually, the question is whether
section one of the amendment by its own force, as interpreted and ap-
plied by the federal courts, forbids the individual's conduct. Occasion-
ally, when Congress has relied on the fourteenth amendment to enact a
statute regulating the individual's conduct, the question is whether sec-
tion five of the amendment delegates such legislative power to Con-
gress, or whether the subject of the federal statute is reserved to the
states by virtue of the tenth amendment.5 In short, the requirement of
state action is an affirmation that the fourteenth amendment "did not
render relations between individuals a matter of federal concern,
whether by judicial scrutiny or congressional regulation."'6
II.
Until fairly recently, most litigation concerning the issue of state ac-
tion dealt with racial discrimination by one individual against another.
Because the state where this discrimination took place did not make it
unlawful, the issue was whether the action of that private individual
was state action. If it was held to be, then, because it was racial dis-
crimination in violation of the constitutional norm of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, it was prohibited by the
Constitution.
At least since the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and since then because of
decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting other federal statutes, the
4. See Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-h- Vis the States: The Dispensability of Jud.
cialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1554-57 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966) (Court sidestepped question whether § 5 of fourteenth amendment authorized Congress to
enact 18 U.S.C. § 241, but Justices Clark and Brennan argued in separate opinions that Congress
possessed such power).
6. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer. Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 475
(1962).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
5, 18, 42 U.S.C.).
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issue of private racial discrimination has largely been mooted. Several
titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which the Court sustained pursu-
ant to Congress' power under the commerce clause,' forbid private ra-
cial discrimination concerning such matters as employment and service
in places of public accommodation. Further, the Court has interpreted
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, promulgated by Congress
under section two of the thirteenth amendment, to forbid private indi-
viduals from engaging in racial discrimination against other persons in
contracts and the sale and lease of real and personal property.9 Finally,
many states have enacted or strengthened their own civil rights laws in
the past two decades.
As a consequence, the major focus of state action litigation today
concerns matters other than racial discrimination. A number of cases
in the lower federal courts concern private discrimination based on sex
or gender to determine whether this discrimination is state action viola-
tive of equal protection.'0 A series of Supreme Court decisions has
dealt with the issue of whether the action of a private institution that
seeks to suppress the communicative activities of others is state action
abridging the first and fourteenth amendments. This may be illustrated
by the group of cases involving shopping centers' attempts to prohibit
labor picketing and political leafletting on their premises. I' The last
and potentially most fruitful source of state action litigation raises the
question of whether certain private individuals or businesses have de-
nied others with whom they have dealt the fourteenth amendment's
protection of procedural due process. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,12 for example, the issue was whether a privately owned gas and
electric company had to give notice and an opportunity for a hearing
before it cut off service to someone whom the company claimed had
failed to pay her electric bill. The threshold problem was whether this
private company should be held to the constitutional responsibilities of
the state under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
8. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
9. See. e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U.S, 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3rd Cir. 1977); Weise v. Syra-
cuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
11. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972);
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
12. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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III.
It has been persuasively argued that state action is a false issue. The
position, put most broadly, is that there is virtually always state action
because all private conduct is undertaken under the aegis of the law of
the state. The point was probably first elaborated by Harold Horowitz,
who contended that "whenever, and however, a state gives legal conse-
quences to transactions between private persons there is 'state ac-
tion.' "1s More recently, Robert Glennon and John Nowak have urged
that there is state action whenever a private individual's conduct "is
lawful within the state" and that "this is true whether the state has ex-
plicitly authorized the, challenged practice or simply allowed it to ex-
ist."' 4
Another, only slightly qualified, statement of this position is that be-
cause the state has extensive power to regulate private individuals' con-
duct, all private action, except that which the state has no constitutional
power to regulate, is state action because it is undertaken with either
express state permission or tacit state toleration.' Thus, is it not only
state action when a state statute or a state executive or administrative
official denies government employment on the basis of race or when a
state statute requires private employers to discriminate on the basis of
race. It is also state action when state common law refuses to recognize
a cause of action for damages or injunctive relief in favor of a job ap-
plicant who proves that he has been denied work by a private employer
on the basis of race. In all these instances, the argument proceeds, the
state-acting through its legislative, executive, or judicial branches-
has made an affirmative policy choice. Therefore, in all these in-
stances-including the last, because we may assume that the defend-
ant-private employer has no constitutional right to racially
discriminate' 6 --there is state action subject to the constraints of the
fourteenth amendment. As Horowitz summarizes the matter:
There is state action in the definition and enforcement of the right-duty
relationship, and there is state action in adjudicating that there is no
13. Horowitz, The Misleading Search/or "Slate Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
S. CAL. L. REv. 208, 209 (1957).
14. Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "Stale Action"
Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 230.
15. For versions of this view with some modifications, see Haber, Notes on the Limits of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 811 (1964); Henkin, supra note 6.
16. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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right-duty relationship. The result reached by the court on the merits is
irrelevant insofar as the presence or absence of state action is concerned.
When state law is applied to determine legal relations between private
persons there is "state action."
1 7
A variation of this view is that the state is responsible for the acts of
private individuals when its courts intervene to render the private acts
effective. This approach reads the beleaguered case of Shelley v. Krae-
mer ' for all it is worth. Any time a court enforces a private common-
law or statutory right, there is state action. By virtue of this rationale,
almost any private transaction can be converted into state action if one
party balks at consensual compliance and forces the other party to
bring legal proceedings to enforce his alleged rights. Once the state
courts are brought in, there is state action.
In expounding this approach, Louis Henkin has suggested that judi-
cial enforcement of certain private choices--choices that could not con-
stitutionally be made by the state itself-although state action,
nonetheless should not be held to violate the fourteenth amendment. If
the state court, for example, would deprive a plaintiff of a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest, such as the right to privacy, by refusing
to enforce his attempted racial discrimination claim on who can enter
his home, the court may or should assist the plaintiff. If the state can-
not constitutionally prohibit private discrimination within the home,
then the defendant's constitutional right to equal protection is out-
weighed by the plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy. Judicial en-
forcement of the plaintiff's constitutional right is still state action, but it
is not state action that denies the defendant equal protection.19
IV.
The difficulty with both the state permission-toleration and judicial
enforcement theories of state action is not that they fail, either logically
or analytically, "to satisfy the demand for 'neutral', general principles
of adjudication" or "to promise consistent application to foreseeable
situations."2 Nor are they at war with the language of the fourteenth
amendment, which requires only that the state neither "deprive" any
person of due process nor "deny" equal protection--consequences that
17. Horowitz, supra note 13, at 209.
18. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19. Henkin, supra note 6, at 487.
20. Id at 502.
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literally may occur through state inaction as well as through state ac-
tion.
Rather, the principal objection to these approaches is that they con-
tradict a central feature of the fourteenth amendment. Although its
major purpose was to augment the authority of the national govern-
ment to secure certain constitutional rights, its primary thrust was to
accomplish this goal by outlawing deprivations of these rights by state
governments and their legal structures rather than by the impact of pri-
vate choice. By effectively obliterating the distinction between state ac-
tion and private action, these theories eviscerate the fourteenth
amendment's restriction on the authority of the national government
vis-A-vis the states regarding the regulation of the myriad relationships
that occur between one individual and another. These approaches re-
quire that all private activity, except that small amount which is be-
yond all governmental control, conform to federal constitutional
standards.
Thus, at the initiative of any litigant who is offended by another per-
son's behavior, these theories would subject to the scrutiny of federal
judges, under substantive constitutional standards customarily devel-
oped for measuring the actions of government, all sorts of private con-
duct that because of political constraints and collective good sense
would probably never be mandated by law. Further, by permitting pri-
vate actors to violate constitutional norms when they have a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest to do so, these theories would
delegate to federal judges the power to implement the vague mandate
of the due process clause in speaking the final word about the validity
of virtually all transactions between individuals. In doing so, the na-
tional judiciary would be required to determine whether private con-
duct was constitutionally immune from governmental control even
though, because of general political sensitivity to individual autonomy,
such private conduct probably would never be regulated by the state.
Finally, these approaches would empower federal legislators with vast
authority under section five of the fourteenth amendment to establish a
body of statutory rules governing many aspects of private affairs-al-
though this last consequence is less significant because of the enormous
power to regulate private conduct that Congress already has been held
to possess under such other grants of authority as the commerce, tax-
ing, and spending clauses of article one, section eight or section two of
[Vol. 1979:757
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/8
COMMENTARY
the thirteenth amendment.2
This objection-especially that element concerning the transfer of
decisionmaking authority to the federal courts-is significantly exacer-
bated by those who urge that the national judiciary go beyond simply
weighing the competing constitutional rights of private individuals and
instead balance the degree of injury to the constitutional rights of the
victims against the competing personal interests of the offending parties.
If the courts are only concerned with conflicting constitutional rights,
then a private individual who violates a constitutional norm hardly
ever will prevail because only rarely will the actor's conduct itself be
constitutionally protected. The weighing function of the courts, there-
fore, will be employed only relatively infrequently. For example, as-
suming state action (as all these theories do), if a privately owned
shopping center seeks to prohibit peaceful labor picketing, which di-
rectly relates to its business, on its premises, there would be a plain
violation of, the picketers' first amendment rights, but-at least under
existing doctrine-the shopping center would have no colorable claim
that it had a constitutionally protected property right to forbid the pick-
eting.22
The role of the courts is greatly expanded, however, if they must
balance constitutional rights against conflicting personal interests.
Thus, in their influential article advocating this approach, Karst and
Van Alstyne urged that in adjudicating these problems the courts
should (1) identify the "multiplicity of interests which compete for re-
spect in each case," (2) assess the impact that alternative judicial deci-
sions would have on these interests, (3) determine the effect of federal
intervention "on the policy of encouraging local responsibility," and
then (4) ultimately balance and select the "values for constitutional
preference. ' 23 The extremely detailed and refined policy-oriented
scope of the suggested judicial inquiry-which, although developed in
the late 1950's and early 1960's in response to the legislatively un-
remedied evil of widespread private racial discrimination, has also
been forcefully articulated more recently-has been carefully described
by a number of other thoughtful commentators.24 For example,
21. See Choper, supra note 4, at 1594-95.
22. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-23 (1976); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 U.S. 105 (1956).
23. Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 2, at 7-8, 58.
24. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1158-60; Glennon & Nowak, supra note 14; Morris &
Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1968); Quinn,
State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1976).
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Horowitz points out that to determine the constitutionality of private
racial discrimination, courts must consider various interdependent fac-
tors such as:
the nature and degree of injury to the person discriminated against, the
interest of the discriminator in being permitted to discriminate, and the
interest of the discriminatee in having opportunity of access equal to that
of other persons to the benefits of governmental assistance to the discrimi-
nator.25
Horowitz also noted:
[i]f there is extensive state participation and involvement related to the
activities of the discriminator, it is more likely that these activities will be
public in nature, with consequent public indignity and humiliation suf-
fered by the person discriminated against . . . When there is govern-
mental assistance to the discriminator in carrying on his activities, and the
assistance is being provided to further the purposes of a governmental
program designed to provide benefits for the public or a permissible seg-
ment of the public, the effect of the discrimination is to deny to the dis-
criminatee the opportunity to have equal opportunity of access to the
benefits of the governmental program.26
It would be foolish to deny that judges do-and must-exercise
judgment, including the weighing and selecting of conflicting values in
constitutional adjudication. But there are "differences of degree" on
which, Justice Holmes reminded, "the whole law" depends "as soon as
it is civilized."'27 It may be wholly appropriate for an appointed federal
judiciary to perform an essentially legislative role, as it does by engag-
ing in a process of particularized balancing of competing interests and
values on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, when passing on the validity of
state regulations of interstate commerce. For there, "the Court does
not exercise the momentous power of judicial review," but rather "acts
only as an intermediate agency between the states and Congress" be-
cause its rulings "may be reversed or modified by ordinary federal stat-
utes."28 But when the Court finds that state action violates the
Constitution, at least under orthodox theory, it speaks the final consti-
tutional word. That being true, I believe that routinely vesting the fed-
eral judiciary with a discretion seemingly as broad as that which it
25. Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing,
52 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1964).
26. Id at 12-13.
27. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
28. See Choper, supra note 4, at 1585.
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employs in the interstate commerce area-as these approaches appear
to do-should only be undertaken, if it should be done at all, with the
greatest reticence and caution.
V.
Another substantial problem common to all these theories of state
action arises as a consequence of a recently clarified doctrine delineat-
ing the scope of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protec-
tion. Unlike other substantive constitutional provisions such as the first
amendment's guarantees of freedom of expression and religion, which
may be violated by the effect of state action irrespective of its purpose,
the Court has held that equal protection may be violated only by inten-
tionally discriminatory action.29 Before discussing these doctrines fur-
ther, I wish to point out that application of these theories of state action
to these substantive constitutional doctrines produces what I believe
most would find to be incongruous results.
This apparent incongruity may be illustrated by varying the facts
and the state action theories argued in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. 30 If the person whose electricity had been cut off by the privately
owned utility sued in a state court for an injunction or damages, claim-
ing that procedural due process required the utility to give her prior
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, then pursuant to the state per-
mission-toleration approach, the state court's refusal to recognize this
cause of action would be state action, and under the decision in Mem-
phis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,3' there would be a violation
of due process. On the other hand, if the same person claimed that the
utility had refused her service because of her race in violation of the
equal protection clause, then again, pursuant to the state permission-
toleration approach, the state court's refusal to recognize the cause of
action would be state action, but under the rationale of Washington v.
Davis,32 there would be no violation of equal protection if the state
court's refusal to grant the claim was based not on racial criteria, but
rather on its racially neutral disinclination to recognize a cause of ac-
29. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
30. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
31. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
32. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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tion for anyone who was refused service by a privately owned utility,
regardless of the reason.
VI.
Although almost all decisions finding a violation of the first amend-
ment's freedom of speech dealt with state action specifically and inten-
tionally directed against expression, state action also may be held to
abridge freedom of speech even though the purpose of the challenged
legal restraint is not directed to suppressing communication, but rather
is intended to accomplish some independent, nonspeech-related regula-
tory end.33 Thus, in United States v. O'Brien34 the Court rejected a first
amendment claim in affirming a conviction for burning a draft card,
but recognized that a statute, although it "furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest" that is "unrelated to the suppression of
free expression," nonetheless may be applied so that its effect on com-
municative activity violates the first amendment: "the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedom" may be "no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of" the governmental interest.35
Similarly, the Court has unequivocally established in religion clause
cases that even though a state regulation may have been fashioned to
serve purely secular goals, its effects nonetheless may be found to im-
permissibly burden the free exercise of religion. For example, in Wis-
consin v. Yoder36 the Court held that Amish parents who declined to
send their children to public school after the eighth grade could not be
required to comply with a state law mandating attendance to age six-
teen:
[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is
not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fun-
damental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing oftheir children. 37
33. See Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined- Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
34. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
35. Id at 377. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). But cf. Mt. Healthy
City School Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (school district may refuse to rehire
teacher even if teacher's constitutionally protected speech "played a substantial part in the deci-
sion," if school district proves "that it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the
absence of the protected conduct").
36. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
37. Id at 214.
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This rule is even plainer for the establishment of religion clause of the
first amendment. Even though a law may have an exclusively secular
purpose, it will be held violative of the establishment clause if "its prin-
cipal or primary effect" either "advances" or "inhibits" religion.3" Fi-
nally, although it is hard to conceive of a regulation, allegedly violative
of procedural due process, that is not itself directed to the issue of what
process is due, it appears that any governmental rule whose effect is to
deny life, liberty, or property can be tested on due process grounds re-
gardless of its motivation.
In contrast, the Court has unqualifiedly developed a doctrinal ap-
proach to the equal protection clause in a series of recent decisions that
requires the state to act with a "purpose to discriminate."39 A "law,
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of gov-
ernment to pursue" is not "invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of
another."4 Nor does a state agency's awareness of the inevitable con-
sequences of its action, even when extraordinarily discriminatory in ef-
fect, avoid the requirement of proof of a state's discriminatory intent.4 '
Finally, this is true even though the discriminatory result is the product
of another actor's deliberate violation of the equal protection norm-
indeed, even when that other actor is a different governmental body.4 2
VII.
The foregoing doctrinal developments have powerful implications
for many earlier decisions that found unconstitutional state action. Al-
though the first that I will consider did not really present the state ac-
tion issue in traditional form, it graphically illustrates the point. In
Norwood v. Harrison43 the Court held that Mississippi's practice of
lending textbooks to students who attended racially segregated private
academies, pursuant to a general program for students in all public and
private elementary schools, violated equal protection. The state pro-
gram constituted undeniable state action. Further, the private acade-
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963).
39. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
40. Id at 242.
41. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).
42. Id
43. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
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mies engaged in unquestionably deliberate racial discrimination. But
though the state was concededly "involved" with the private schools,
petitioners made no showing, as required under existing doctrine to
sustain a violation of the equal protection clause, that any state agency
engaged in purposeful racial discrimination. Indeed, the Court explic-
itly disclaimed any need to assume "that the State's textbook aid to
private schools has been motivated by other than a sincere interest in
the educational welfare of all Mississippi children."'
The Court's result could have been achieved on the ground that the
state's program, although racially neutral, nonetheless violated equal
protection because, as its attackers alleged, it impeded Mississippi's
"acknowledged duty to establish a unitary school system."45 In the
special context of remedying prior deliberate school segregation, the
Court earlier had held that "the existence of a permissible purpose can-
not sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."4 6 Since then,
the Court has been even more explicit: "[T]he measure of the post-
Brown conduct of a school board under the unsatisfied duty to liqui-
date a dual system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in
decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system."47
But in Norwood the trial court found that the Mississippi program did
not interfere with desegregation48 and the Supreme Court, although
casting doubt on that finding, held it to be "irrelevant"49 in any event:
"A State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of
operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of
giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidi-
ous discrimination. 5 °
In the later decision of Gilmore v. City of Montgomery5 I in which the
Court similarly enjoined racially neutral state aid, in the form of exclu-
sive use of public recreational facilities, to segregated private schools,
the Court specifically relied on the fact that "this assistance signifi-
cantly tended to undermine the federal court order mandating the es-
tablishment and maintenance of a unitary school system in
44. Id at 466.
45. Id at 460-61.
46. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972).
47. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (1979).
48. 413 U.S. at 460-61.
49. Id at 468.
50. Id at 467.
51. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
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Montgomery." 2 Indeed, in Gilmore the Court implied that the result
in Norwood might also be so explained.53 Without this justification,
Norwood is exceedingly difficult to square with contemporary equal
protection doctrine.
Even more perplexing is the tak of reconciling Norwood with the
earlier ruling in Board of Education v. Allen54 in which the Court held
that New York's lending of textbooks to students who attend church-
related schools, pursuant to a general program for students in all public
and private secondary schools, did not violate the establishment clause.
As in Norwood, the state's program in Allen had a constitutionally neu-
tral purpose: "furtherance of the educational opportunities available to
the young.""5 But, unlike Norwood, the Court found no impermissible
effect in Allen. Although I agree with the Court's conclusion in A1-
len56-which, although consistently reaffirmed, has been effectively
gutted by subsequent decisions involving aid to church-related
schools 5 -surely, if the effect of Mississippi's textbook law in Norwood
-significantly aid[ed] the organization and continuation of a separate
system of private schools""8 that racially segregate, then so, too, did the
effect of New York's textbook law in Allen aid parochial schools. Be-
cause a discriminatory effect is in itself inconsequential under equal
protection doctrine, but an impermissible effect is dispositive under es-
tablishment clause doctrine, the results in Norwood and Allen seem
strangely at odds with one another.
VIII.
Other Supreme Court state action decisions have been similarly con-
fused by the recently articulated equal protection rationale. Foremost
among them is Shelley v. Kraemer59 in which the Court reversed a state
court's enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant and held that the
52. Id at 569.
53. Id at 570 n.10.
54. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
55, Id at 243.
56. See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
2,0 (1968).
57. See, e.g.. Wolman v. Waiter. 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5%. 413 U.S. at 467.
59. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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state court's action constituted state action in violation of equal protec-
tion.
Under the theories of state action that we have considered, it is obvi-
ous that state action existed in Shelley. What is not obvious, however,
is whether the conceded state action violated the equal protection
clause. Indeed, because it was not shown that the state court, the state
agency involved in the case, had any racially discriminatory purpose,
but rather appeared to be acting in a racially neutral manner in giving
effect to a private agreement, there would be no violation of the four-
teenth amendment under contemporary equal protection doctrine. Al-
though the state court certainly knew that the consequences of its
action would be to effectuate the private discrimination, this knowledge
alone does not meet the need to find intentional discrimination by the
state.
The required racial animus might be attributed to the state court on
the basis of principles of property law. At common law (at least after
the early decades of the twentieth century),60 restraints on the aliena-
tion of property were presumptively void. Courts generally held re-
straints valid only if the restraints were found by the court to be
reasonable and consistent with public policy.61 Further, they were to
be construed whenever possible to avoid the restraint.62 Indeed, some
state courts employed this principle to refuse enforcement to a racially
restrictive covenant.63 It might be argued, therefore, that by enforcing
the restraint in Shelley, the state court awarded the restraint its own
imprimatur, making a policy decision to favor racial discrimination
and thus acting itself with a prohibited discriminatory intent.64 (This
situation would be analogous to a state commission's permitting en-
forcement of rules proposed by a regulated entity only after the com-
mission's formal approval of the rule rather than by the commission's
routine acceptance of the proposed rule without expression of approval
60. See Bowman, The Constitution and Common Law Restraints on Alienation, 8 B.U.L. REv.
1 (1928).
61. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406 (1944) (especially § 406(1)). See generally Bruce, Ra-
cial Zoning By Private Contract in the Light of the Constitutions and the Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation, 21 ILL. L. REV. 704 (1927).
62. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 418 (1944).
63. See Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944); Clark v. Vaughan, 31 Kan.
438, 292 P. 783 (1930); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1938).
64. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES, COM-
MENTS & QUESTIONS 1412 (4th ed. 1975).
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or disapproval.)65 Whether this concept of property law was suffi-
ciently clear to sustain this rationale and the result in Shelley is uncer-
tain.6 6 But the decision cannot be grounded simply by finding that
state court enforcement of contracts is state action.
Ix.
Another leading Supreme Court state action decision whose ration-
ale and result may now be questioned by contemporary equal protec-
tion doctrine is Reitman v. Mulkey.6 7 It concerned a racially neutral
provision of the California constitution that established the right of real
property owners to sell or lease to anyone they chose, thus nullifying
California statutes that forbade racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing and disempowering the California legislature from
enacting such laws in the future. The Court held that this provision
violated equal protection, although the precise basis for its conclusion
was somewhat ambiguous. There is language in the opinion implying
that state action-and the California constitutional provision was un-
doubtedly state action-runs afoul of the equal protection clause if it
"encourages" or "authorizes" private racial discrimination.6 Taken
literally, this approach conflicts with the requirement of intentional dis-
crimination by the state.
Several qualitative gradations of state action affect private individu-
als, some of which plainly satisfy the state intent requirement under
current doctrine and some of which plainly do not. At one end of the
spectrum is state action that compels private persons to discriminate. A
law of this kind represents an affirmative choice by the people of the
state to produce a uniform and pervasive rule for conduct in the com-
munity. Consequently, the intent of the collectivity, the state, governs
rather than that of the individual.6
9
At the other end of the spectrum is state action--or, more frequently,
state inaction-that merely permits (or tolerates) private discrimina-
tion. State permission may take the form of the state having no rule
65. Compare Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), with Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
66. See McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation bj' State Court Enforcement ofRestrictive
.4greemens, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. Rav. 5, 10-11
(1945).
67. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
68. Id at 380.
69. See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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that forbids the private discrimination or having a statute that simply
codifies this condition.71 In itself, this does not evidence a discrimina-
tory purpose by the state. Nor is the requisite state intent supplied by
characterizing this type of state action as authorizing or even encourag-
ing private discrimination because the state does not forbid it. To illus-
trate, suppose a state has no rule that prohibits smoking in public
buildings. It may fairly be said that the state permits or tolerates the
conduct. The state may even be seen as authorizing or encouraging it
in some sense. But this alone by no means shows collective endorse-
ment of smoking generally or in public buildings particularly. Indeed,
the state may simultaneously do many things strongly indicating its dis-
approval of smoking such as forbidding advertising, requiring health
hazard warnings, or even posting signs urging no smoking in public
buildings.
More difficult issues in demonstrating a discriminatory state purpose
lie between these two extremes. If a state were to award benefits (such
as money or jobs) on the explicit condition that the recipients engage in
a certain kind of discrimination, then the state, although not compel-
ling the discrimination, nonetheless would be encouraging it through
an articulated collective policy choice that plainly manifests the state's
motivation. A similar state policy choice would exist if the govern-
ment, without announcing its intention, were to give assistance (finan-
cial or otherwise) to private persons because they engaged in a certain
kind of discrimination. The government's purpose, because not openly
stated, would be harder to prove, of course, but recent Supreme Court
decisions7' abandoning earlier dogmas72 make that proof permissible
and possible. Thus, if the purpose, rather than merely the effect, of the
Mississippi textbook aid program in Norwood had been shown to en-
courage private school segregation, the Court's result would conform
with present equal protection doctrine.
Further, if a state were to take racially neutral action, such as renting
its property to a private individual without including a nondiscrimina-
tion clause in the lease, whose purpose could be shown to encourage,
influence, or induce private racial discrimination, again there would be
a violation of equal protection. One commentator has suggested that
70. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
71. See, eg., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
72. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); MeCray v. United States, 195
U.S. 27 (1904).
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Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,73 which is exceedingly hard to
justify otherwise under contemporary equal protection doctrine, may
be explained on this basis.74
Indeed, the same analysis is applicable, although problems of proof
are extraordinarily compounded, if a state were to repeal a law that
previously forbade private racial discrimination and if one could show
that the state's purpose was not merely to permit or tolerate subsequent
private discrimination, but was actually to encourage it. This rationale
might preserve the result in Reitman v. Mulkey under present equal
protection doctrine. The Court emphasized at several points in its
opinion the conclusion of the California Supreme Court-which ap-
pears to be an excellent, if not preferred, arbiter for the presently per-
mitted inquiry into the motive for its own state's actions7 5-that the
challenged California provision's "design and intent" 76 was to en-
courage private discrimination. For example, "the [California] court
could 'conceive of no other purpose . . . aside from authorizing the
perpetuation of a purported private discrimination.' ,77
On the facts it is debatable whether this interpretation is adequate to
prove motive, because the California court's decision is also subject to
an interpretation that the effect of the provision, which had been ap-
proved by a vote of 4.5 million to 2.4 million in a statewide election,78
encouraged private discrimination. But the new doctrine, which allows
proof of legislative motive to find state action violative of equal protec-
tion, provides the analytic framework. Indeed, taken the full length of
its logic, this doctrine extends to holding unconstitutional a legislature's
failure to pass an antidiscrimination law when, and if, one can demon-
strate that the purpose for inaction was to promote private acts of racial
bigotry.
X.
The foregoing discussion of how state action might be found to vio-
late equal protection in various instances has not considered the issue
of the remedy that follows a violation. The conventional remedy for
73. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
74. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1160 n.13.
75. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
76. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 374 (1967).
77. Id at 375.
78. Id at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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unconstitutional state action is to order the state to desist. But in state
action cases, the principal relief often sought is not against the state, but
against the offending private individual. 9
In many contexts, this difference presents no real problem. If the
Court had found the Mississippi textbook program in Norwood to have
an impermissible purpose, its challengers would have accomplished
their aim by obtaining an injunction against the state's continuing to
lend books to students who attend racially segregated academies. (In-
deed, it is possible that the schools would end their discriminatory poli-
cies if this were a condition for receiving the aid.) If the Court had
found the state court's enforcement of the racially restrictive covenant
in Shelley to be based on the court's policy judgment approving such
restraints on alienation, prohibiting the state court enforcement would
satisfy the needs of the black purchaser. If the Court had found the
California constitutional provision in Reitman to be designed to influ-
ence private racial discrimination in housing, holding it inoperative
would revive the California statutes that forbade racial discrimination
and thus afford the victims the cause of action under the statutes that
they originally pursued. Even in Burton, if the Court had found the
state's failure to include a nondiscrimination clause in its lease to be the
product of racial animus, ordering insertion of the clause would com-
pletely rectify the objectionable situation.
The matter of an effective remedy becomes more difficult, however,
in other contexts. Suppose a state law compels privately owned restau-
rants to segregate racially and a restaurateur calls the police, who arrest
a racially mixed group that remains on the premises after being refused
service. Although the state law is plainly invalid, does a trespass con-
viction of the group constitute state action that violates equal protec-
tion even when the restaurateur testifies that he would have segregated
regardless of the state law? In Peterson v. City of Greenville"0 the Court
held that it was invalid state action, reasoning that the judiciary would
not attempt "to separate the mental urges of the discriminators."'' l
This prophylactic rule of evidence may well be justified to reverse a
state criminal conviction that enforces private conduct mandated by
79. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
80. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
81. id at 248.
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state law at the time it occurred. Further, the rule that a private per-
son's motivation is to be treated as if it were the state's might even be
extended to an action by a rejected job applicant for an injunction (or
damages?) against a private employer whose deliberately discrimina-
tory hiring policy is shown to be responsive to his receipt of govern-
ment benefits on the condition that he so discriminate. But it would be
extremely problematic to construct an irrebuttable presumption that
equates a private individual's act of racial prejudice with state action
for the purpose of enjoining the discriminator or holding him liable for
damages simply because the state has adopted a racially neutral regula-
tion-or failed to enact a prohibitory rule-with the proven intention
of encouraging or influencing discriminatory private action. The state
regulation is plainly enjoinable-indeed, even the state inaction may be
remediable, at least in theory-unless the state proves "that the same
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered." 2 But it does not follow that the private individual's
conduct is unconstitutional if the individual shows that he would have
acted the same way in any event. And if it is not unconstitutional, it
cannot be remedied. Similarly, even when one proves that the state
deliberately chose to assist private persons because they engage in dis-
crimination that is forbidden to the state, it is quite unlikely that the
state, once the invalid state aid is stopped, can be charged with the
ongoing discrimination of the private actor (if he so continues); it is
even more unlikely that the private actor's motivation can be identified
as the state's. Thus, further remedies for equal protection violations are
foreclosed.
XI.
We have seen that under the logically appealing state permission-
toleration and judicial enforcement approaches to the problem, state
action may be found in practically all dealings among private individu-
als. But even if it is analytically possible, although by no means neces-
sarily desirable either in terms of original intent or the proper role of
the national judiciary, to subject most private conduct to such constitu-
tional norms as procedural due process and the freedoms of speech and
religion, there may be no violation of equal protection under contem-
porary doctrine unless the state action is itself purposefully discrimina-
82. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 n.21 (1977).
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tory. As a consequence, no matter how pervasive or profound the
impact of intentional private discrimination (whether against racial or
ethnic minorities, aliens, women, illegitimate children, or some other
group that obtains solicitous judicial protection from invidious govern-
ment action), it is not constitutionally remediable unless the state, act-
ing through its legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative officers,
has deliberately discriminated. Even then, as just indicated,83 it may
well be that one cannot obtain relief against the private discriminator.
Therefore, wholly apart from the other formidable objections to the
theories that have been discussed, there may be substantial merit, de-
spite vigorous and persuasive criticism to the contrary,8 4 in directing
state action analysis to the question of whether certain private individ-
uals or organizations should be held to the constitutional responsibili-
ties of the state. This "actor-focused"" 5 inquiry would permit the
federal judiciary in certain circumstances to conclude that equal pro-
tection has been denied and may be remedied, although there is no
proof of an official discriminatory purpose, but only that the "private"
actor has abridged the constitutional norm.
XII.
The "actor-focused" analysis with strongest judicial credentials is
that which asks whether the conduct of a private group amounts to the
performance of a "government function." 6 This analysis is a useful
approach to the problem and I shall further explore its contours. In
addition, I believe that from both the perspective of history and the
contemporary demands of our system, there is much to say for Ralph
Winter's view that a major function of the fourteenth amendment's
state action provision is "to regulate the exercise of centralized power-
the kind of power that might be consciously employed to foreclose indi-
vidual competition in a free market. 87
Although this is not the place to develop fully this idea, at its core is
the fact that at the end of the eighteenth century and at the time of the
framing of the fourteenth amendment, the most familiar wielder of
83. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
84. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1147-74.
85. See Glennon & Nowak, supra note 14, at 227.
86. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 64, at 1386-1400.
87. Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality. From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare
State, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 741, 744.
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such authority was the state. But because of the evolution of various
nongovernmental institutions in our society as well as the growth of
technology, personal liberties "that were once vulnerable only to the
power of government become subject to private determination." 8
Thus, as an adjunct to the "government function" inquiry, I would sug-
gest, under what I have elsewhere called the "power theory" approach
to finding state action,"9 that conduct of a private individual or organi-
zation that has a widespread and fundamental impact on other private
individuals should be held to the obligations that the Constitution im-
poses on the state. Although these several terms obviously are not self-
defining and, as we shall see,90 occasional applications of these ap-
proaches will require courts to weigh legitimately competing constitu-
tional claims, I believe that the process is manageable in a way that
conforms with the appropriate role of an independent judiciary under
our scheme of government.
There is little dispute, at least within the Supreme Court, that the
action of a private organization in conducting the only meaningful
election of public officials in a particular area,9' or in controlling who
may speak on the sidewalks or streets of a particular town all of whose
property it owns, 92 meets the criteria of both the "power theory" and
"government function" approaches and should be held to the state's
constitutional responsibilities. It should be emphasized that whether
these activities have been consciously delegated by the state to the pri-
vate organization (by a statute, or a license, or the like), or whether
they are extensively regulated by the state, is irrelevant to the out-
come.9 3 Of course, if it could be shown that the state formally dele-
gated this or any other activity to a private party with the intent of
facilitating the denial of constitutional rights, even under prevailing
equal protection doctrine the state's delegation could readily be en-
joined and so, too, perhaps, could the conduct of the private actor.94
But, in the instances under consideration, it is the exercise of power
rather than its source that is determinative.
88. Note, State Action Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 656, 698 (1974).
89. See WV. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 64, at 1398-1400.
90. See text accompanying notes 101-04 infra.
91. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
92. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
93. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
94. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
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The Court, speaking twice in recent years through Justice Rehnquist,
would limit the reach of this rationale to the private exercise of a "gov-
ernment function" (or "public function"), which it defines as a power
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."95 But although this
condition plainly satisfies the "government function" and "power the-
ory" approaches, it does not exhaust them. For example, it may well be
that given "the experience of several American entrepreneurs who
amassed great fortunes by operating parks for recreational purposes," 96
the maintenance of such a park is not a function that is "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state." Empirical data might actually reveal
that in some American cities the size of, say, Macon, Georgia, where
Evans v. Newton97 arose, the only park (or all the parks) is privately
owned. But if our nation's experience also disclosed that virtually all
communities like Macon have parks that are generally open to the pub-
lic, and that our cities' tradition is to have at least one such municipally
owned park unless otherwise supplied by a private donor, courts should
hold private ownership or operation of the only park to be a "govern-
ment function" and thus subject to the fourteenth amendment.
Similarly, it is clear that the operation of elementary and secondary
schools is not an enterprise that is "traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State." But a comprehensive survey of school districts in the
United States would surely show that virtually all maintained at least
one public elementary and secondary school unless, because of some
peculiar development, the educational needs of the community's chil-
dren were historically always met by a privately funded school. Such a
school-or at least one of such schools if there are several in the hypo-
thetical community (and which one is the one may present a nice ques-
tion)--is, in effect, serving as a substitute for the conventional public
school that the school district would otherwise provide. In this sense, it
is performing a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State." In terms of this function-providing public education-the pri-
vate school is wielding monopoly power and should be held to the con-
stitutional responsibilities of the state. The same analysis should apply
for other providers of basic services-the sole hospital in a community
might prove to be one-which our historic and evolving traditions indi-
95. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
96. Id. at 159 n.8.
97. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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cate would be supplied by the public but for the existence of the private
counterpart.
A slightly different situation arises with an activity that, although not
traditionally performed by government, is nonetheless, as Justice Mar-
shall described the provision of gas and electricity, "of such public im-
portance that the State invariably either provides the service itself or
permits private companies to act as state surrogates in providing it."
98
When a private institution exclusively controls such an essential serv-
ice, it possesses that kind of monopolistic, government-like control
which meets the "power-theory" test for finding state action. Although
judicial determination of this matter plainly will not be mechanical, a
perception of reality, widely shared values, and common sense may
provide adequate guidance in most instances to properly confine the
courts' discretion. As Justice Douglas put it in the Metropolitan Edison
case, when gas or electricity "is denied a householder, the home, under
modem conditions, is likely to become unlivable."99
Other illustrations are readily available. The most obvious may be
found when "government creates a situation of scarcity, whether by
conferring territorial monopoly power or by issuing a limited number
of licenses and forbidding performance of a designated service without
a license,"' ° such as in Metropolitan Edison. Thus, in Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,' there should
have been no difficulty in finding that federally licensed broadcasting
stations held sufficient power over people's ability to communicate ef-
fectively to be subjected to first amendment responsibilities in exercis-
ing that power, although, as Justice Brennan observed, 0 2 the
broadcasters' substantial first amendment rights (which arguably may
be qualified because of the power the broadcasters voluntarily ac-
quired) that had to be accommodated with the competing rights of
those who wished to use their broadcasting facilities complicated reso-
lution of the particular substantive issue in the case.
A similar analysis is applicable in Moose Lodge v. Irvis.10 3 Justice
Douglas contended in dissent that because of Pennsylvania's "complex
98. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 372 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id at 361 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1172.
101. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
102. Id at 182-83 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
780 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
quota system" for issuing licenses, liquor was "commercially available
only at private clubs for a significant portion of each week,"" and that
no more club licenses could be issued in Harrisburg where the Moose
Lodge was located. But the critical question under the "power the-
ory"---the question that was not addressed in any opinion in the case-
was whether all (or most) club licensees discriminated against blacks.
If a substantial number did not and, therefore, liquor was readily acces-
sible to persons irrespective of race, then neither the Moose Lodge nor
any other club licensee that did racially discriminate could be found to
possess the requisite power to justify burdening them with the state's
constitutional obligations. But if all or most club licensees refused to
serve blacks, the action of at least one should be subjected to fourteenth
amendment constraints. Again, the ultimate decision on the merits
must account for the club licensee's legitimate competing claim of con-
stitutionally protected freedom of association.
When the state has deemed a particular service or commodity suffi-
ciently important to confer on its providers monopoly status, the con-
ferral constitutes persuasive, perhaps conclusive, evidence that the
requisites of the "power theory" have been met. 0 5 But, as indicated
above,'0 6 it is the possession of exclusionary force, not its origins, that
controls. Thus, even though it has no license from the state, a single
private institution that functions as a "natural monopoly" for a basic
service-a position "created by the economic forces of high threshold
capital requirements and virtually unlimited economy of scale"' °7 _
falls within the coverage of the "power theory."
A nonlicensed private company that is the exclusive supplier of gas
and electricity in a particular area fits this description. A large modem
shopping center that is shown on the facts to have realistically replaced
the downtown area of the traditional American city by exercising effec-
tive monopoly power over people's opportunities to communicate to
the public also qualifies for inclusion. So, too, may a group of private
persons who constitute the sole source of a basic good or service. For
example, if all the restaurants (or lawyers, or doctors, or the like) in a
particular community adopt a uniform policy-whether pursuant to
104. Id at 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. Cf Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (purveyor's characterization of written
material is relevant in determining whether it is "obscene").
106. See text following note 94 supra.
107. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 352 n.8.
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agreement, custom, or individual preference-that violates a constitu-
tional norm, one may view the impact of their action as having the
monopolistic force of law. '0 As a consequence, at least one of them-
and again, the problem of which person or group it should be must be
explored-is a strong candidate for imposition of the state's constitu-
tional obligations.
XIII.
Stated broadly, the government function and power theory ap-
proaches to state action result in holdings that find the conduct of cer-
tain kinds of private individuals and organizations to constitute state
action. An important qualification, however, which is probably already
clear from earlier discussion, should now be emphasized.
A private institution that has monopolistic, government-like power
should be held to the state's constitutional responsibilities only in re-
gard to specific aspects of its activities. It should be subject to the four-
teenth amendment only in the exercise of the monopolistic,
government-like control that it possesses. In the Jackson case, for ex-
ample, the Metropolitan Edison Company had sufficient power over a
basic service to come within the power theory. Consequently, the com-
pany would be barred from abridging fourteenth amendment norms in
selling gas and electricity. But unless the company were shown to have
market exclusionary force in employment opportunities-and it is con-
ceivable that in some communities the facts might substantiate this
conclusiont 9-it would not be subject to constitutional constraints in
its hiring process. Nor would the Jaybird Democratic Association in
Tern' v. Adams... be constitutionally forbidden from refusing to em-
ploy blacks as office personnel. The power exercised by Metropolitan
Edison concerned the provision of gas and electricity, not employment
opportunities; the government function performed by the Jaybirds con-
cerned holding elections, not affording a labor market.
108. See generally Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 192 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Cf Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (California constitution's equal protection provision held to forbid employ-
ment discrimination against homosexuals by privately owned utility with state-guaranteed mo-
nopoly over 80% of in-state telephone service market).
110. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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XIV.
A major feature of the government function and power theory ap-
proaches is to permit courts to find certain conduct by certain kinds of
private individuals or organizations violative of equal protection and to
remedy the violation even in the absence of any official purpose to dis-
criminate. But the efficacy of these approaches need not be so limited.
Because they harmonize historically cherished values with the realities
of contemporary society, these approaches also might be used when
private actors who exercise monopolistic, government-like power trans-
gress the norms of other constitutional protections such as procedural
due process and the freedoms of expression and religion. In contrast to
the state permission-toleration and judicial enforcement theories of
state action, the government function and power theory approaches
tend to avoid conflict with a central purpose of the fourteenth amend-
ment-preserving a meaningful distinction between state action and
private action-and to ameliorate the problem of vesting federal courts
with an enormous discretion to adjust the allocation of authority within
our federal system of government.
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